To analyse cryptographic properties of distributed systems in a systematic way, a formal theory is required. In this paper, we present a theory that allows (1) to specify distributed systems formally, (2) to verify their cryptographic wrt. composition properties, and (3) to demonstrate the correctness of syntactic interfaces for specified system components automatically. To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach we use a typical example from the domain of crypto-based systems: a variant of the Internet security protocol TLS. A security flaw in the initial version of TLS specification was revealed using a semi-automatic theorem prover, Isabelle/HOL.
INTRODUCTION
Systems are often specified and implemented following the modularity principle: a number of separate components are combined together to build the desired system. This usually leads to the question on how to derive the system properties from the properties of its components. In the case of crypto-based systems, the most important and the most difficult question is to derive which of the cryptographic (security/secrecy) properties the composed system will have. Thus, a formal theory is required to not only specify systems and their cryptographic formally, but also to analyse them. As the paper-and-pencil proofs are not enough for this case, applying theorem provers or model checkers is necessary to have semi-automated solutions.
In this paper, we discuss a formal theory for specification and verification of security-critical systems and their cryptographic properties. The focal point of this approach is readability of formal specifications as well as the composition of components and their properties. The modelling language we use in our approach, FOCUS ST , allows us to create concise but easily understandable specifications and is appropriate for application of the specification and proof methodology presented in our previous works.
FOCUS ST (Spichkova et al., 2014; Spichkova, 2016) is based on human factor analysis within formal methods to offer more readable specifications. The FOCUS ST language was inspired by FOCUS (Broy and Stølen, 2001 ), a framework for formal specification and development of interactive systems. In both languages, specifications are based on the notion of streams that represent a communication history of a directed channel between components. However, in the original FOCUS input and output streams of a component are mappings of natural numbers N to the single messages, where a FOCUS ST stream is a mapping from N to lists of messages within the corresponding time intervals. The FOCUS ST specification layout also differs from the original one: it is based on human factor analysis within formal methods (Spichkova, 2012b; Spichkova, 2013a ).
This theory is a result of optimization and extension (on the verification as well as on the specification level) of the draft ideas presented in technical reports (Spichkova and Jürjens, 2008; Spichkova, 2012a) . Similar to our previous work on formal specification of security-critical systems, we apply the proposed theory on a typical example from the domain of crypto-based systems: a variant of the Internet security protocol TLS (Apostolopoulos et al., 1999) . We also discuss the differences to the corresponding FO-CUS specifications, especially focusing on the readability aspects. Using the extended approach with FOCUS ST , we can demonstrate a security flaw in the protocol and show how to prove security properties of a corrected version. We also can apply to the FOCUS ST solution the verification methodology Focus on Isabelle (Spichkova, 2007) , which allows verification using an interactive semi-automatic HigherOrder Logic theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. The corresponding proofs are presented in the Archive of Formal Proofs (Spichkova, 2014) .
RELATED WORK
Security is critical to the development of software systems in many application areas. Thus, there also are many approaches on developing of such systems. A brief survey of software engineering techniques for computer security can be found in (Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000) . The closest to our work in this field is the approach for secure software engineering using the CASE tool AutoFocus presented in (Wimmel, 2005) : it uses a modelling tool based on the restricted part of the FOCUS specification language, but do not cover the aspects of verification and properties composition, which we concentrate on.
There are also many papers on verifying cryptographic protocols (Paulson, 1998; Meadows, 2000; Ryan and Schneider, 2000) . In comparison to them, we do not focus in our work on the protocol verification itself, but use the TLS protocol as a case study to show the advantages of our theory.
A large number of the approaches focus on modelbased development of security-critical systems, cf. e.g., (Alam et al., 2007; Whittle et al., 2008) , however, a correct composition of system specifications or system models and, in particular, deriving the properties of a composed system is treated as one of the most difficult objective (Broy, 1997; Bézivin et al., 2006; Brunet et al., 2006) independently which kinds of system properties are discussed. Moreover, dealing with the composition of security-critical components and their security properties we get even more complex and costly task, to solve it we need to develop an appropriate theory of composition which allows a formal verification/derivation of system properties in addition to a readable specification of system components.
An approach on the verification of equivalence properties was introduced in (Chadha et al., 2012) . For security analysis of padding-based encryption schemes was presented in (Barthe et al., 2013) . There were also a number of approaches applied symbolic analysis of security protocols. For example, approach based on multi-set rewriting systems and first-order logic was presented in (Schmidt et al., 2012 ). An approach presented in (Meier et al., 2013) , focuses on efficient deduction and equational reasoning, and introduces the corresponding TAMARIN prover. Model Checking solutions are also very popular, cf. e.g., (Permpoontanalarp, 2010) . Comparative Analysis of 15 Model Checking tools for security protocol verification was presented in (Patel et al., 2010) , proposing the Scyther and AVISPA tools as mostly suitable for the purpose. In our case, the approach is supported by Isabelle/Isar theorem prover for higher-order logic.
BACKGROUND: FOCUS

ST
A system in FOCUS and FOCUS ST is represented by its components that are connected by communication lines called channels, and are described in terms of its input/output behaviour. The components can interact and also work independently of each other. A specification can be elementary or composite, where composite specifications are built hierarchically from the elementary ones. In both languages, any specification characterizes the relation between the communication histories for the external input and output channels, and the formal meaning of a specification is exactly this external input/output relation.
For any set of messages M, M ω denotes the set of all streams, M ∞ and M * denote the sets of all infinite and all finite streams respectively, M ω denotes the set of all timed streams, M ∞ and M * denote the sets of all infinite and all finite timed streams respectively.
The FOCUS and FOCUS ST specifications can be structured into a number of formulas each characterizing a different kind of properties. These languages support a variety of specification styles which describe system components by logical formulas or by diagrams and tables representing logical formulas. The most general style in FOCUS and FOCUS ST is an Assumption/Guarantee style, where a component is specified in terms of an assumption and a guarantee: whenever input from the environment behaves in accordance with the assumption asm, the specified component is required to fulfill the guarantee gar.
We specify the semantics of a composite component S = S 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ S n as defined in (Broy and Stølen, 2001) :
where l S denotes a set of local streams and L S denotes their corresponding types, [[ S j ]] denotes semantics of the specification S j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, which is a specification of subcomponent of S. The collection of FOCUS ST operators over timing aspects and their properties specified and verified using the theorem prover Isabelle is presented in the Archive of Formal Proofs (Spichkova, 2013b) . In this work we focus on modelling of security aspects and the corresponding properties of composition. Before introducing the new concepts, we would like to mention very shortly a small number of operators we used in the paper: An empty stream is represented by . x denotes the one element stream consisting of the element x. #s denotes the length of the stream s.
ith time interval of the stream s is represented by s i . msg n (s) denotes a stream s that can have at most n messages at each time interval.
SECRECY
In this section we introduce a FOCUS ST formalization of security properties of data secrecy, corresponding definitions, and a number of abstract data types used in this formalization. This formalization yields a basis for verification in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL, technical details of verification and the corresponding proofs are presented in (Spichkova, 2012a) ).
We assume here disjoint sets Data of data values, Secret of unguessable values, and Keys of cryptographic keys. Based on these sets, we specify the sets EncType of encryptors that may be used for encryption or decryption, CExp of closed expressions, and Expression of expression items:
Below, we will treat an expression (that can for example be sent as an argument of a message within the distributed system) as a finite sequence of expression items. then denotes an empty expression.
The decryption key corresponding to an encryption key K is written as K −1 . In the case of asymmetric encryption, the encryption key K is public, and the decryption key K −1 secret. For symmetric encryption, K and K −1 coincide. For the encryption, decryption, signature creation and signature verification functions we define only their signatures and general axioms, because in order to reason effectively, we view them as abstract functions and abstract from their bit-level implementation details, following the usual Dolev-Yao approach to crypto-protocol verification (Dolev and Yao, 1983) :
Enc, Decr, Sign, Ext ::
Decr(CKey −1 , Enc(CKey, e)) = e
We denote by K P ⊆ Keys and S P ⊆ Secret the set of private keys of a component P and the set of unguessable values used by a component P, respectively.
We assume in our specification that the composition of components has a number of general properties which sometimes seem to be obvious, but for a formal representation is essential to mention these properties explicitly either we can't (edit:cannot) make the proofs in a correct way.
The sets of private keys and unguessable values used by a composed component C = C 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C n must be defined by union of corresponding sets.
(1) If xb is a private key of the composed component C, then this key must belong to the set of private keys of one subcomponents of C:
(2) If xb is an unguessable value used by the composed component C, then this value must belong to the set of unguessable values used by one subcomponents of C:
If xb is a private key of one subcomponents of the composed component C, then this key must belong to the set of private keys of C:
If xb is an unguessable value used by one subcomponents of the composed component C, then this value must belong to the set of unguessable values used by C:
(5) If xb does not belong to the set of private keys and unguessable values of any subcomponent of PQ = P ⊗ Q, then xp does not belong to the set of private keys and unguessable values of PQ:
(6) If a channel x belongs to the set of input (output) channels of the composition PQ = P ⊗ Q for any two components P and Q, then this channel must belong to the set of input (output) channels of P or Q:
For the collection of the theorems and prepositions on the input/output properties proven in Isabelle/HOL (more than 50 Isabelle/HOL lemmas) we would like to refer to (Spichkova, 2014) . (m = m 1 m 2 ), and A knows both these secrets,
Knowledges of an Adversary
• A knows some secret key k −1 and the result of the encryption of the m with the corresponding public key, • A knows some public key k and the result of the signature creation of the m with the corresponding private key, • m is an encryption of some secret m 1 with a public key k, and A knows both m 1 and k, • m is the result of the signature creation of the m 1 with the key k, and A knows both m 1 and k. Formally, we define this term by mutually recursive predicates know A (k) (for the case of a single secret m) and knows A (k) (for the case when expression (or list) k, containing a secret) respectively.
Subsequently, we add axioms that describe relations between the predicates know/knows and the predicate describing that a component may eventually output an expression. Axiom 1. For any component C and for any secret m ∈ KS (or expression e ∈ Expression * ), the following equations hold:
∀ e ∈ Expression * :
Axiom 2. For any component C and for an empty expression ∈ Expression * , holds:
For the collection (more than 50 Isabelle lemmas) of propositions and theorems on the properties of the predicates know/knows, we would like to refer to (Spichkova, 2014) .
TLS PROTOCOL
To demonstrate the feasibility and usability of our approach, we specified a variant of the TLS protocol 1 in FOCUS ST and discuss the features of the specification templates that were introduces to increase the readability of the language. After that we present the formal analysis of the protocol.
The goal of TLS is to let a client send a secret over an untrusted communication link to a server in a way that provides secrecy and server authentication, by using symmetric session keys. Let us recall the general idea of the handshake protocol of TLS, cf. Figure 1 . The protocol has two participants, Client and Server, that are connected by an Internet connection. We used the following auxiliary data types:
• Obj = {C, S} to represent participants names (C for the Client and S for the Server),
• StateC = {st0, st1, st2} to represents the states of the Client,
• StateS = {initS, waitS, sendS1, sendS2} to represent the states of the Server,
• Event = {event} to represent events of message sending (e.g., an abort message or an acknowledgement), and
• InitMessage = im(ungValue ∈ Secret, key ∈ Keys, msg ∈ Expression) to represent the event of protocol initiation by the Client.
Client initiates the protocol by sending the message that contains an unguessable value N ∈ Secret, its the public key K C , and a sequence C, CKey of its name and its public key signed by its secret key CKey −1 . Server checks whether the received public key matches to the second element of the signed sequence. If that is the case, it returns to the Client the received unguessable value N, an encryption of a sequence genKey, N (signed by its secret key SKey −1 ) using the received public key, and a sequence S, SKey of its name and its public key, signed using the secret key CAKey −1 of the certification authority. For the corresponding representation in Isabelle/HOL we would like to refer to the technical report. We continue with the discussion how our approach can be used to demonstrate a security flaw in the TLS variant introduced above, as well as how to correct it.
Client Server
We specify every component using assumptionguarantee-structured templates. This helps avoiding the omission of unnecessary assumptions about the system's environment since a specified component is required to fulfil the guarantee only if its environment behaves in accordance with the assumption. We also use in FOCUS ST so-called implicit else-case constructs: if a variable is not listed in the guarantee part of a transition, it implicitly keeps its current value. An output stream not mentioned in a transition will be empty.
Without these extensions, the specification of the components would become less readable, as the core properties would be lost in a huge set of properties that might be specified implicitly. For example, the specification of the Client would require 4 additional properties, such as
Thus, the corresponding FOCUS specifications of Client and Server would have 10 and 9 properties re- 
where secr = Ext(CAKey, resp t ) res = Ext(enc, Decr(CKey −1 , resp t ))
Figure 2: FOCUS ST specification of the Client component spectively, in contrast to 6 and 5 properties we have in the FOCUS ST version. Even when for a small example like TLS the difference might not look huge, it scales dramatically for large systems. Moreover, the specifications of the properties would be more complicated without these optimisations. For example, the 4th property of Server in the FOCUS version would be
In FOCUS ST also do not require to introduce auxiliary variables explicitly: The data type of an unintroduced variable is universally quantified in the specification such that it can be used with any data value. 
Security Analysis
In this section, we use our approach to demonstrate a security flaw in the TLS variant introduced above, and how to correct it. Let us assume a composite component P = Client ⊗ Server. To show that P does not preserve the secrecy of secretD, secretD ∈ KS, we need to find an adversary component Adversary with I Adversary ⊆ O P such that
• knows Adversary (m) holds with regards to the composition, and
• m does not belong to the set of private keys of Adversary or to the set of unguessable values of Adversary,
This can be formalised as the below statement:
∃ Adversary :
This means, we have to analyse a possible composition Client ⊗ Adversary ⊗ Server, cf. Figure 4 . The protocol assumes that there is a secure (wrt. integrity) way for the client to obtain the public key CAKey of the certification authority, and for the server to obtain a certificate Sign(CAKey −1 , S, SKey ) signed by the certification authority that contains its name and public key. For an arbitrary process Z, an adversary may also have access to
• CAKey,
• Sign(CAKey −1 , S, SKey ), and
• Sign(CAKey −1 , Z, ZKey ).
Consider the FOCUS ST specification of the component Adversary presented in Figure 5 . This component is weakly causal: we assume that the adversary does not delay any message. We used in this specification an auxiliary data type AdvStates = {initA, sendA1, sendA2}. The value genKey ∈ Keys is a symmetric session key generated by the server: genKey −1 = genKey. This implies that holds. Thus, if the adversary knows the value of genKey it also knows the value of genKey −1 . If we trace its knowledge base as its evolves in interaction with the protocol components, we get that Adversary will know the secret secretD at the time unit 4.
Translating the FOCUS ST specifications to Isabelle/HOL, we can prove formally that the security flaw exists. These proof (together with protocol component specifications and auxiliary lemmas) takes 1,5 klop (thousands lines of proofs). This also allows us to demonstrate the correctness of syntactic interfaces for specified system components automatically.
In this paper we present only the main lemma which says that the during the 4th time unit the secret data secretD will be send to the adversary by the Client component and no abort-signal will be produced: For further details we would like to refer to the Isabelle/HOL-theories we uploaded to the Archive of Formal Proofs (Spichkova, 2014) .
Fixing the Security Weakness
To fix the security weakness, we need to change the protocol: the client must find out the situation, where an adversary try to get the secret data. Thus, we need to correct the specification of the server in such a way that the client will know with which public key the data was encrypted at the server, and this information must be received by the client without any possible changes by the adversary. The only part of the messages from the server which cannot be changed by the adversary is the result of the signature creation -the adversary does not know the secret key SKey −1 and cannot modify the signature or create a new one with modified content. Therefore, we add the public key received by the server to the content genKey, N of the signature. If there is not attack, this will be CKey, in the attack scenario explained above, it would be AKey. Accordingly, in the specification of the Server, we change the value of resp t+1 in the 5th formula to the following one:
Enc(key(init t ft ), Sign(SKey −1 , genKey, ungValue(init t ft ), key(init t ft ) )) Also, correspondingly we add a new conjunct to the condition for the correct data receipt in the specification of the client:
trd.Ext(snd.Ext(CAKey, resp t trd ), Decr(CKey −1 , resp t snd )) = CKey If we trace the knowledge base of the adversary Adversary considered above, the secret is not leaked, the transmission will be aborted by the client on the 4th time unit.
We omit here the complete presentation of the FO-CUS and Isabelle/HOL specification of the corrected components Client and Server, because they have only the minor changes vs. the specification presented in the previous section. The Isabelle/HOL proof takes also about 1,5 klop, but the most number of lemmas can be reused from the uncorrected version.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a theory that allows (1) to specify distributed systems formally, (2) to verify their cryptographic wrt. composition properties, and (3) to demonstrate the correctness of syntactic interfaces for specified system components automatically. The theory is based on the FOCUS ST formal language, and the verification is conducted using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
The feasibility of this approach was demonstrated by specifying and formally analysing a variant of the Internet security protocol TLS, which is a typical example from the domain of crypto-based systems. We analysed the protocol using both paper-andpencil proofs and the automated verification with Isabelle/HOL. The analysis revealed a security flaw in the initial version of TLS specification. The protocol specification was harden according the proposed approach.
